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Epistemic Injustice and The Preservation of Ignorance 
 
Ignorance is not always bad; far from it. Looking at the issue in its most general 
aspect there is the obvious point that for finite beings massive ignorance is a 
precondition of having an epistemically functional life, for cognitive overload is an 
epistemic liability. There is an indefinite, indeed infinite, number of things that we do 
not have the slightest need to know²the number of hairs on your head at midnight on 
your next Birthday, for instance. Furthermore, we actively need not to know most of 
them (or not to spend time and energy investigating them) in order to conserve 
cognitive capacity for those things that we do need to know. Less abstractly there is 
also the point that there are many things it would be morally and/or prudentially bad 
to know²intimate details that are none of our business; techniques of criminality; 
methods of rekindling old ethnic hatreds in a population. These points are familiar 
from debates about µWKHYDOXHTXHVWLRQ¶LQUHODWLRQWR knowledge.1 Furthermore, as 
Cynthia Townley has argued, many forms of epistemic cooperation, and many of the 
dispositions involved in epistemic virtues generally, depend crucially upon our 
leaving some useless or harmful things unknown, and passively or actively preserving 
RWKHUV¶LJQRUDQFHRIWKLQJV they need not or should not know (Townley 2011). In 
short, good epistemic practice is necessarily highly selective in all sorts of ways. 
What matters is that we know what we need to know, expanding outwards to the 
broader aim of knowing and telling what we should know and tell, given our purposes 
and broadly ethical obligations all things considered. Good epistemic conduct needs 
to be understood as the maintenance of appropriate balances of knowledge and 
ignorance, in oneself and also in relation to others. 
This opening reflection on the epistemic value of ignorance and its place in the 
epistemic economy directs our attention to the basic normative ambivalence in our 
use of the term.2 µIgnorance¶PD\ refer simply to an epistemically innocent absence of 
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 For debate about what ignorance is necessarily ignorance of, see for instance the 
exchange between Pierre Le Morven (2010 and 2011) and Rik Peels (2011). 
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knowledge (this absence being advantageous or disadvantageous, as the case may be, 
without any reflection on the conduct of the epistemic subject in question); or 
alternatively it may refer to some kind of cognitive failure, which might be non-
culpable (perhaps the result of misleading evidence) or which might, on the other 
hand, represent a blameworthy failure to put the requisite effort or skill into knowing 
something one ought to know.  
This paper will focus on those forms of culpable and non-culpable ignorance 
that are created or preserved by one or another kind of epistemic injustice that I have 
elsewhere ODEHOOHGµWHVWLPRQLDOLQMXVWLFH¶DQGµKHUPHQHXWLFDOLQMXVWLFH¶3 I shall 
discuss the first only briefly, for it is more specifically in relation to hermeneutical 
injustice that new and complex issues have recently been raised concerning various 
different forms of ignorance that can be involved in this phenomenon. In particular I 
hope to say something useful DERXWWKHSODFHRIµZLOlIXO¶4 or motivated ignorance, and 
to thereby contribute to recent debates in which the phenomenon of hermeneutical 
injustice has been related WRZKDW&KDUOHV0LOOVKDVWHUPHGµZKLWHLJQRUDQFH¶5 
Ultimately I shall argue that the phenomenon Mills characterises on the whole picks 
out a different kind of ignorance from any that is involved in hermeneutical injustice. 
But I shall also argue that the two categories can overlap. 
 
 
Preserving Patterns of Social Ignorance: Testimonial Injustice and 
Hermeneutical Marginalisation 
 
When the level of credibility attributed to DVSHDNHU¶V word is reduced by prejudice 
operative in the hearer¶VMXGJHPHQWWKHVSHDNHUVXIIHUVDtestimonial injustice. 
Despite the specific label, the speech act in which his word is expressed need not be 
strictly that of testimony or telling, but might equally be the airing of an opinion, 
suggestion, or relevant possibility. Furthermore, as Christopher Hookway has 
suggested, it might even be occasioned by the asking of a question that is designed to 
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contribute to some shared inquiry.6 The prejudice driving any case of testimonial 
injustice may or may not be a belief, and it operates specifically in the hearer¶V
judgement of credibility, where the judgement may be unreflective and spontaneous²
a matter of ingrained habit. (The trained quasi-perceptual dispositions governing such 
MXGJHPHQWV,KDYHHOVHZKHUHODEHOOHGWKHKHDUHU¶VµWHVWLPRQLDOVHQVLELOLW\¶.) The 
influence of prejudice in judgements of credibility can make itself felt regardless of 
WKHKHDUHU¶VEHOLHIVindeed in spite of them, for prejudice can operate unconsciously 
RUDVZHKDYHQRZOHDUQHGWRVD\DWWKHOHYHORIµLPSOLFLWELDV¶7 Testimonial 
LQMXVWLFH¶VREYLRXVFRQQHFWLRQWRLJQRUDQFHLVWKDWLn cases where the speaker knows 
that p DQGWKHSUHMXGLFHRSHUDWLYHLQWKHKHDUHU¶Vcredibility judgement prevents her 
learning that p from the speaker, other things equal she thereby stays ignorant of p. 
Testimonial injustice not only blocks the flow of knowledge, it also blocks the 
flow of evidence, doubts, critical ideas and other epistemic inputs that are conducive 
to knowledge. The free circulation of these epistemic goods is conducive to 
knowledge not only in the direct sense that ready-made items of knowledge may 
themselves be transmitted, but also in the indirect sense that such items tend also to 
constitute reasons to believe other things, so that they may have the epistemic power 
to convert other of the hearers beliefs into knowledge. The obstructions that 
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 I am grateful to Chris Hookway for this point that someone who puts a question as a 
contribution to collective inquiry (perhaps in the classroom) might find her question 
passed over due to prejudice (Hookway, 2010). I hope I may ultimately be allowed 
this as a limiting case of testimonial injustice, even though it concerns a speech act 
WKDWLVQRWDQDVVHUWLRQ7KHODEHOµWHVWLPRQLDOLQMXVWLFH¶ZDVDOZD\VH[SOLFLWO\
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ZKHUHDVSHDNHUµH[SUHVVHVDSHUVRQDORSinion to a hearer, or airs a value judgement, 
RUWULHVRXWDQHZLGHDRUK\SRWKHVLVRQDJLYHQDXGLHQFH¶)ULFNHUS
+RRNZD\¶VFDVHRIWKHVWXGHQW¶VUHOHYDQWTXHVWLRQDGPLWWHGO\VWUHWFKHVP\
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potentially vulnerable to a prejudicial credibility deficit then it seems more or less to 
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WDNHµFUHGLELOLW\¶LQLWVHYHU\GD\VHQVHDVFRYHULQJWKe wide range of respects in 
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judgement includes not only what is said but also the speaker. At any rate, I hope 
these considerations provide enough commonality to keep the diverse possibilities 
VXIILFLHQWO\XQLILHGXQGHUWKHFDWHJRU\µWHVWLPRQLDOLQMXVWLFH¶ 
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 There is a fast growing philosophical literature drawing upon empirical work in 
psychology on implicit bias. See, for instance, Holroyd (2012), Saul (2013), Gendler 
(2014), Nagel (2014), Leslie (forthcoming), and Saul & Brownstein eds. 
(forthcoming). 
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testimonial injustice introduces into the circulation of such epistemic items is 
therefore not only bad for the person whose word is prejudicially downgraded; it is 
epistemically bad for the hearer, and for the epistemic system quite generally. An 
epistemic system characterised by testimonial injustice is a system in which ignorance 
will repeatedly prevail over potentially shared knowledge, despite VSHDNHUV¶EHVW
efforts. Where a speaker knRZVVRPHWKLQJWKHKHDUHUGRHVQ¶W (and where the level of 
credibility deficit is such that the hearer does not accept what she is told) WKHKHDUHU¶V
ignorance is conserved. Alternatively, where the speaker is offering evidence with a 
(positive or negative) bearing on something the hearer already believes but does not 
know, then the hearer misses out on reasons which (if positive) might render her 
belief knowledge or at least lend it greater justificatory weight; or which (if negative) 
might disabuse her of a false belief, or at least reveal it as less well supported than it 
had seemed. Either way, an opportunity for epistemic improvement is lost, and 
ignorance prevails. 
A further, more buried, form of epistemic damage caused by testimonial 
injustice is that, where it is persistent and socially patterned (as anything driven by 
prejudice is likely to be), it will tend to create or increase hermeneutical 
marginalisation. That is to say, it will tend to create and sustain a situation in which 
some social groups have less than a fair crack at contributing to the shared pool of 
concepts and interpretive tropes that we use to make generally share-able sense of our 
social experiences. We might gloss this idea of a pool of concepts and interpretive 
WURSHVDVµVKDUHGVRFLDOPHDQLQJV¶ZKHUHWKHLGHDLVWKDWZKLOHWKLVpool will surely 
not exhaust all the various up and running sets of social meanings that are being used 
locally by this or that group in a given society, the shared pool (elsewhere I have 
called this the µFROOHFWLYHKHUPHQHXWLFDOUHVRXUFH¶FRQWDLQVonly meanings that just 
about anyone can draw upon and expect those meanings to be understood across 
social space by just about anyone else. The collective hermeneutical resource contains 
those concepts and conceptualisations that are held in common. 
This means that being a member of a social group that does not contribute on 
an equal footing with other groups to that shared interpretive resource (a position of 
hermeneutical marginalisation) puts one at an unfairly increased risk of having social 
experiences that one needs, perhaps urgently, to understand and/or communicate to 
certain powerful social others²to a teacher, an employer, a police officer, a jury²but 
which cannot be made mutual sense of in the shared terms available. We are only 
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now, for instance, entering a historical moment in the West at which it is increasingly 
possible for a young person RULJLQDOO\DVVLJQHGDVµPDOH¶ to be able to say to a parent, 
teacher, or friend that she had always felt herVHOIWREHDJLUOLQµWKHZURQJERG\¶DQG
hope to be understood as expressing an intelligible experience. Increasingly the 
various concepts and conceptions of how sex, gender, sexual orientation and other 
deep identity affiliations may be organised and re-organised in an individual¶V
experienced identity²notably the FRQFHSWRIµWUans¶together with its less established 
FRXQWHUSDUWµFLV¶²are gradually entering the shared hermeneutical resource instead of 
staying local to the trans community. Still now, where a trans woman might attempt 
to describe her experience of gender identity to a social other who does not share the 
relevant concepts, she is unlikely to be able to make herself much understood, and 
this is where her remaining hermeneutical marginalisation will manifest itself in the 
unfair deficit of intelligibility that constitutes a hermeneutical injustice. Like 
testimonial injustices, this kind of hermeneutical injustice preserves ignorance, for 
that which remains insufficiently intelligible to the relevant social other cannot be 
passed on to them as knowledge. 
Here we see how closely the two kinds of epistemic injustice are related: 
testimonial injustice can create or sustain hermeneutical marginalisation by blocking 
the flow of reports, ideas and perspectives that would help generate richer and more 
diversified shared hermeneutical resources that all can draw on in their social 
understandings, whether of their own or of RWKHUV¶H[SHULHQFHV7KHrefore the broad 
patterns of testimonial injustice²most likely patterns created by the operation of 
negative identity prejudices, inasmuch as these are the chief systematic prejudices²
will tend to reproduce themselves as patterns of hermeneutical marginalisation, and it 
is these that give rise to systematic hermeneutical injustices. Thus we can see how the 
preservation of hearer-ignorance that is the likely effect of any instance of testimonial 
injustice can contribute directly to the hermeneutically marginalised position of the 
speaker. And a hermeneutically marginalised speaker is vulnerable to hermeneutical 
injustice. Charles Mills has noted this close connection between the two kinds of 
epistemic injustice in respect of race: 
 
µ$SSO\LQJWKHVHFRQFHSWV [of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice] to racial 
domination, we could say that white ignorance is achieved and perpetuated 
through both varieties working in tandem: a general scepticism about non-
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white cognition and an exclusion from accepted discourse of non-white 
categories and frameworks of analysis. Thus a double handicap will result²
people of color will be denied credibility and the alternative viewpoints that 
could be developed from taking their perspective seriously will be rejected«¶
(Mills, 2015 p. 222; italics added). 
 
So the two kinds of ignorance that are preserved through the operation of the two 
kinds of epistemic injustice are causally connected, and this interconnection is part of 
why our subject-variant areas of ignorance²especially our ignorance of different 
areas of our shared but dramatically stratified social world²tend to display the 
patterns of social power. 
 
 
Clarifying Hermeneutical Injustice²Spaces for localised hermeneutical 
practices 
 
Hermeneutical injustice is internally diverse in various dimensions. One internal 
differentiation we can usefully emphasise is between two sorts of case. The difference 
is between a radical case where the person concerned is at least temporarily unable to 
make full sense of her own experience even to herself; and a more moderate sort of 
case where she understands the nature of her own experience perfectly well, and, 
furthermore, is able to communicate it to members of a social group to which she 
belongs, and yet she is unable to render it intelligible across social space to some 
significant social other to whom she needs to convey it.  
In Epistemic Injustice I tried to bring out this distinction by way of a more 
extreme contrast between ZKDWZHPLJKWFDOODµmaximal¶ and a µminimal¶ case²that 
is, between a case where the individual was not in a position to make proper sense of 
her own experience even to herself; and, by contrast, a case where the individual 
could make perfect sense of it, and could have communicated it to almost any social 
other except the particular social others he specially needed to communicate it to. 
These two opposite extremes were intended to imply a continuum of possibilities in 
between²i.e. a range of cases in which there is shared intelligibility across an 
increasingly large group or groups. The maximal example²drawn from Susan 
%URZQPLOOHU¶VPHPRLURIWKH86women¶VOLEHUDWLRQ movement (Brownmiller 
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1990)²was that of a woman in late-sixties North America, Carmita Wood, who was 
being sexually harassed at work but for whom extant hermeneutical resources did not 
enable her to experience this lucidly for what it was, so that while she experienced it 
as upsetting, intimidating, demeaning, confusing... somehow she was also aware that 
these forms of understanding did not capture it. As recounted by Brownmiller, 
Carmita Wood remained confused about what it was she was experiencing, because 
there was an objective lack of available concepts with which to make proper sense of 
it. Her achievement was to find a community of women who together created a safe 
discursive space in which to explore their experiences and find a way of interpreting 
them that rendered them more fully intelligible. Through dialogue within the group 
they hit upon a critical composite ODEHOµVH[XDOKDUDVVPHQW¶, and they overcame their 
hermeneutical marginalisation in this regard by demanding that the term and the 
interpretation it expressed become part of the wider shared vocabulary. 
In The Epistemology of Resistance José Medina emphasises that marginalised 
groups may often have perfectly functioning and sophisticated sets of interpretive 
practices up and running within their social group or community, which however do 
not work communicatively outside the group²the non-sharedness of the requisite 
concepts and interpretations reflecting the fact that WKHµSULYLOHJHG¶ meanings held in 
common are inadequate.8 This is indeed worth emphasising, and in this connection I 
would reaffirm the idea that the concepts and meanings that are shared by all are 
bound to reflect, in the broad, the perspectives and experiences of those groups with 
more social power generally, for the reason that those with more social power are 
very likely to be over-contributors to the shared hermeneutical resource. (That 
tendency, that alliance of hermeneutical power with other kinds of social power, is 
present in the very idea of hermeneutical marginalisation.) Accordingly, the 
possibility of localised hermeneutical practices is built in to the picture of how 
Carmita Wood and her fellow consciousness raisers overcame hermeneutical 
injustice. The group was of course not a pre-existing community, but like other such 
groups it swiftly developed a voice of its own, operating in a relation of dissonance 
and dissent as regards mainstream understandings. If we jump forward a couple of 
years from the time of the consciousness raiVLQJJURXS¶VILUVWPHHWLQJV we would find 
a fully operative localised hermeneutical practice among feminists who readily named 
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sexual harassment for what it was, even while that concept had not yet entered the 
shared hermeneutical resource, recalcitrant employers and all, as later it came to do. 
This represents a localised well-functioning hermeneutical practice that nonetheless 
leaves its practitioners susceptible to hermeneutical injustice whenever they should 
attempt to render the experience intelligible across social space to others who are non-
conversant, perhaps resistant to, the requisite modes of interpretation. 
Contrasting with the maximal case exemplified by Carmita Wood, the 
minimal case of hermeneutical injustice presented in Epistemic Injustice also, and 
more explicitly, illustrates the possibility of a fully functioning yet insufficiently 
widely shared hermeneutical practice. It is already a case of such a practice, though 
not this time on the part of anyone generally lacking in social power. The example 
ZDVWKDWRI-RHWKHFHQWUDOFKDUDFWHULQ,DQ0F(ZDQ¶VQRYHl, Enduring Love 
(McEwan 1998). Joe is being stalked by a religious fanatic who wants to convert him. 
Joe is an educated, white, middle-class man, whose hermeneutical marginalisation (if 
any²it is the vanishingly minimal case) is highly specific, localized to the particular 
matter in hand, and whose experience he himself has no difficulty in understanding 
and would easily be able to communicate to members of almost any social group.9 
And yet when it comes to the most important social body to which he needs to be able 
to communicate it, namely the police, he finds they are not in a position to make 
proper sense of it²there is quite literally no appropriate box to tick on their form. 
Thus I would argue that a commitment to the existence of localised 
interpretive practices that may perfectly capture a given range of experiences but 
whose meanings are not sufficiently shared across wider social space is already 
present at the heart of the original account of hermeneutical injustice.  I gladly 
acknowledge, however, the importance of centre-staging, as others have done10, what 
I am here calling midway cases of hermeneutical injustice²those situated somewhere 
between maximal and minimal in virtue of the fact that they concern existing 
communities who operate localised or in-group hermeneutical practices that are 
nonetheless not shared across further social space. These are cases in which there are 
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sophisticated interpretive practices, perhaps with their own history of internal 
challenge and change, which are already functionally entrenched for a given social 
group or groups, but not shared with at least one out-group with whom 
communication is needed. Members of such hermeneutically self-reliant groups are 
vulnerable to hermeneutical injustices whose form does not involve any confused 
experiences whatever, but only frustratingly failed attempts to communicate them to 
members of an out-group. (In the next section we shall see this midway form of 
hermeneutical injustice put to work in relation to a special case of white ignorance.) 
Medina is right to emphasise that the intersectional ignorances created by the 
possession and non-possession of this or that cluster of interpretive concepts growing 
out of this or that area of social experience tell a µSRO\SKRQLF¶or multi-voiced story of 
power and resistance, societal conceptual impoverishment and localised interpretive 
sophistication and creativity. These opposing energies are present in both maximal 
and minimal cases, but the creative and affirming energy involved in resisting 
mainstream meanings and nurturing instead a set of more localised concepts and 
interpretations is obviously more to the fore in those cases of hermeneutical injustice 
that start from a situation in which a relatively powerless group has developed well-
entrenched but localised interpretive practices of its own. In such cases in-group 
intelligibility is doing just fine; and any hermeneutical injustices that arise will be 
strictly a matter of unfairly limited communicative intelligibility in relation to an out-
group.  
An illustration of such a midway case of hermeneutical injustice might be 
drawn from the history of post-colonial race relations in the U. K. Drawing on an 
account of the experience of growing up in post-War Britain as the children of 
&DULEEHDQLPPLJUDQWVWRµWKHPRWKHUFRXQWU\¶²often symbolized by the Empire 
Windrush arriving at Tilbury Docks in 1948²we find that the experience of 
integration into British life was not structured in relation to the conceptual poles of 
µDFFHSWDQFH¶RUµUHMHFWLRQ¶WRZKLFKWKHZKLWHSHUVSHFWLYHJDYHULVH,QVWHDGWKHEODFN
experience was structured in relation to the concept of citizenship. Mike Phillips and 
Trevor Phillips recount it as follows: 
 
We observe that the overt declarations of racist hostility which were 
commonplace in the fifties have, more or less, disappeared from public life in 
Britain. On the other hand, it is clear that racial hostility and exclusion are a 
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routine part of British life, and few black British people can be in any doubt 
that the majority of their fellow citizens take the colour of their skins to be a 
characteristic which defines what they are and what they can do. 
 At the same time, paradoxically, among ourselves we never interpreted 
WKHUDFLDOGLVFULPLQDWLRQRUKRVWLOLW\WKDWZHHQFRXQWHUHGDVµUHMHFWLRQ¶ODUJHO\
EHFDXVHZHQHYHUEHOLHYHGWKDWµDFFHSWDQFH¶RUµUHMHFWLRQ¶ZDVDFKRLFH
available to Britain. Far from it. Our instinct told us that such notions were 
merely part of a racialised idiom, describing an identity which had long ago 
FHDVHGWREHUHOHYDQW)RUXVWKHLVVXHZDV«DERXWRXUVWDWXVDVFLWL]HQV«¶
(Phillips & Phillips 1998, p. 5).  
 
What their instinct told them formed the cornerstone of their localised 
conceptualization of their situation²an understanding not supplied by the shared 
hermeneutical resource dominated by the µUDFLDOLVHGLGLRP¶WKDWFKDUDFWHULVHGthe 
perspective of white Britain²and it delivered a mode of understanding which they 
were rightly concerned to insist on introducing into the common pool of 
understanding: an idea of black colonial immigrants as fellow British citizens.  The 
Empire had told their parents that Britain was their mother country and it seems that 
they had, in part at least, believed and internalized this fact²many had signed up to 
fight in the war under the identity it imposed²so that those arriving in Britain on 
ships like the Windrush µUHJDUGHGWKHLU%ULWLVKQHVVDVQRQ-QHJRWLDEOH¶3KLllips & 
Phillips 1998, p. 5). The mother country had made them British, and now it was a 
PDWWHURIKROGLQJKHUWRWKHIXOOLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKDWVWDWXV,GHDVRIµDFFHSWDQFH¶RU
µUHMHFWLRQ¶PD\KDYHVWUXFWXUHGZKLWHFRQVFLRXVQHVVDURXQGWKLVLPPLJUDWLRQEXt the 
immigrant population was living an independent and novel conceptualization 
according to which they were black British citizens²a hermeneutical trope seemingly 
absent from the repertoire of the white population. One could say the concept of a 
black British citizen had not yet taken hold in white British consciousness, and white 
resistance to that conceptual neologism was such that it would take some significant 
time to do so. 
In this example, it seems the sooner the new conceptualisation could become 
widely entrenched in the shared hermeneutical resource the better. But it is worth 
remembering that there can be cases in which it may not be in the interests of an 
oppressed group to fight immediately for the introduction of local meanings into the 
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wider collective hermeneutical resource. (This is a point PDGHE\0LOOVTXRWLQJµWKH
EODFN$PHULFDQIRONSRHP³*RWRQHPLQGIRUZKLWHIRONVWRVHH$QRWKHUIRUZKDW,
NQRZLVPH´0LOOVSDQGDOVRHPSKDVLVHGE\Medina.11) Sometimes there 
can be significant advantage in keeping things local, perhaps so that there is more 
WLPHLQDVDIHVSDFHWRGHYHORSRQH¶VGLVVHQWLQJIRUPVRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJRUSHUKDSV
simply because the wider climate makes it pointless, or too dangerous to try anything 
else. To take an example now from the history of race in the U. S., in a radio 
interview the writer Alice Walker describes aspects of her upbringing under 
segregation in the American South in terms that indicate the value of maintaining 
hermeneutical privacy. Confident in their own interpretations of the social world, her 
parents inculcated in their children a way of understanding racial oppression that 
might be read as incorporating a certain security in on-going hermeneutical 
separation: 
 
Lucky for us we lived very far in the country. We saw very few white people. 
And when we went to town we followed rules about where we could go. And 
we just followed our parents. They basically helped us to see white people as, 
you know, very stunted. That was just the way they were. There was nothing 
you could do about it, they were just like that. (Who knew why they were like 
that?) And that was helpful. They were discussed as if they were the 
ZHDWKHU«/LNHµ2KZHOOWKDW¶VKRZWKH\DUH<RXNQRZZKDWZHWU\WR
encourDJHLQRXUFKLOGUHQWKH\EHDWLWRXWRIWKHLUFKLOGUHQ7KH\GRQ¶WZDQW
WKHLUFKLOGUHQWREHNLQG7KH\GRQ¶WZDQWWKHLUFKLOGUHQWRHYHUVHHDEODFN
person and think of them as human. 12 
 
Here the idea that white people ZHUHµYHU\VWXQWHG¶FDSWXUHV a localized hermeneutical 
practice that embodied a clear and confident knowledge that black people were not as 
white people painted them, and moreover that the racial attitudes of white people only 
showed them up as seriously morally damaged. The moral knowledge at large in the 
black community could not on the whole cross the segregated social space to find 
                                                        
11
 µ$VPDQ\/DWLQDIHPLQLVWVDQGFRORQLDOWKHRULVWVKDYHDUJXHGFRORQL]HGSHRSOHV
have a long tradition of exploiting the ignorance and hermeneutical limitations of the 
FRORQL]HUVWRWKHLUDGYDQWDJHZKLFKFDQEHMXVWLILHGIRUWKHVDNHRIWKHLUVXUYLYDO¶
(Medina 2013; p. 116). 
12
 Desert Island Discs. 2013. BBC Radio 4, May 24th. 
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intelligible expression in the white community. Thus the hermeneutical practices that 
produced that moral knowledge in the black community was, judging from WDONHU¶V 
account, highly localised7KHFRPPHQWDERXWµZHDWKHU¶LVSDUWLFXODUO\UHVRQDQWLQ
this connection. Perhaps when the terms of segregation mean that the normal µreactive 
attitudes¶ of moral participation can only be a losing game, it is empowering to reach 
instead for what P. F. Strawson identifies as the µobjective¶ attitude of non-
engagement, so that the agency of certain others is received as weather²meaningless 
(if potentially dangerous) causal impacts to be managed, tolerated, avoided.13 Keeping 
RQH¶VKHUPHQHXWLFDOSUDFWLFHVORFDOLVHGLQDVLWXDWLRQVXFKDVWKLVPLJKWEHDGHFLVLRQ
to leave the powerful to their pitiful ignorance, safeguarding RQH¶Vlocalised forms of 
moral and social understanding as a source of in-group solidarity and strength.  
 
 
White Ignorance and Hermeneutical Injustice 
 
Continuing with questions of race and the different forms of ignorance that can be 
generated and preserved by the operation of epistemic injustice, let me now relate our 
discussion to a GLIIHUHQWNLQGRILJQRUDQFHZKDW&KDUOHV0LOOVKDVQDPHGµZKLWH
LJQRUDQFH¶0LOOVI would like to offer an account of the boundaries of the two 
phenomena.14 I shall argue that for the most part the ignorance that is produced and 
maintained by hermeneutical marginalisation, and made manifest in hermeneutical 
injustice, is different in two key respects from the ignorance in white ignorance. First, 
white ignorance is normally epistemically culpable; and, second, it does not generally 
involve any paucity of conceSWVRQDQ\RQH¶VSDUW%\FRQWUDVW in a case of 
hermeneutical injustice the uncomprehending hearer is normally epistemically non-
culpable; and there is always, definitively, a paucity of shared concepts. However, I 
hope to identify where the two phenomena can overlap. 
MRVWJHQHUDOO\VSHDNLQJµZKLWHLJQRUDQFH¶is a racialized form of ideological 
thinking. It names a certain kind of collective interested or motivated cognitive bias in 
what social interpretations and/or evidence for such interpretations a racially 
dominant group attends to and integrates into the rest of their beliefs and 
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 See Strawson (1974). 
14
 See the substantial discussion of this issue in Medina (2013); and discussions in 
Mason (2011), Pohlhaus (2012), and, in different terms, Dotson (2012). 
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GHOLEHUDWLRQV0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\WKHODEHOµZKLWHLJQRUDQFH¶QDPHVDPRWLYDWHGELDVRQ
the part of white people WDNHQDVDJURXSWKDWOHDYHVWKHPµLJQRUDQW¶LQWKLVVSHFLDO
sense) of the situation of their black compatriots taken as a group. We might say it 
names a form of collective denial in the white community about some uncomfortable 
truths.15 It therefore typically exhibits a culpable motivated irrationality.  Indeed in 
PRVWFDVHVRIµZKLWHLJQRUDQFH¶DVWKDWSKHQRPHQRQLVGLVFXVVHGLWLQYROYHVVRPH
self-serving epistemic fault on the part of whites²a conscious or unconscious 
resistance to accepting or learning about the sources of their social advantage, for 
instance. Such epistemic faults are generally culpable. As Rebecca Mason succinctly 
SXWVLWµZKLWHLJQRUDQFHLVDNLQGRIHSLVWHPLFDOO\FXOSDEOHDQGPRUally noxious 
misFRJQLWLRQWKDWIDFLOLWDWHVWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKHVWDWXVTXR¶0DVRQS 
Mills first discussed the phenomenon in the framework of the U. S., but more 
recently he has made clear that he considers the issue to have global application. 
Referring back to his paper µ:KLWH,JQRUDQFH¶0LOOVKHH[SODLQV 
 
My discussion in the essay was focused mainly on the United States, but I 
intended the application of the concept to be much broader. Insofar as the 
modern world has been created by European colonialism and imperialism, and 
insofar as racist assumptions/frameworks/norms were central to the theories 
justifying white Western conquest and domination of that world, we would 
expect white ignorance to be global (Mills, 2015 p. 217). 
 
We might illustrate his point with another example drawing on British colonial 
history, as pointed out by Mike and Trevor Phillips in their discussion of the 
ignorance produced by the sheer absence of black soldiers from the many British 
films about the war made in the post-War period:  
 
«LWFRPHVDVDVKRFNQRZWRQRWHWKHFRPSOHWHDEVHQFHRIEODFN&DULEEHDQRU
African participants in the plethora of British films about the Second World 
War. After all, the involvement of black colonials was a fact that was a part of 
                                                        
15
 In 0LOOV¶OLVWRIHOHPHQWVLWLVFOHDUWKDWYDULRXVIRUPVRIPRWLYDWHGLUUDWLRQDOLW\
denial, or other forms of epistemic culpability characterize the phenomenon. He says, 
IRULQVWDQFHµWKHG\QDPLFUROHRIZKLWHJURXSLQWHUHVWVQHHGVWREHUHFRJQL]HGDQG
ackQRZOHGJHGDVDFHQWUDOFDXVDOIDFWRULQJHQHUDWLQJDQGVXVWDLQLQJZKLWHLJQRUDQFH¶
(Mills, 2007, p. 34). 
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RXUH[SHULHQFH«2XUDVWRQLVKPHQWZDVDQGVWLOOLVWRGRZLWKWKHH[WHQWWR
which they had disappeared, had been expurgated from the story, as if they 
had never existed (Phillips & Phillips 1998, p. 5). 
 
Let us looNFORVHO\DW0LOOV¶ characterisation of white ignorance in order to see 
(a) whether all cases are epistemically culpable, and (b) whether any involves the 
paucity of concepts that is definitive of hermeneutical injustice . Mills presents two 
main forms of white ignorance, and they share what he calls µUDFLDOL]HGFDXVDOLW\¶²
that is, each involves the white community failing to grasp certain facts or to hold 
certain truthful interpretations of their social world where a significant part of the 
explanation why not is race. First, such racially caused ignorance might take the form 
RIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDFWLYH racism blocking certain truths; or, second, it might be more 
structural in form. Mills says in this connection: 
 
[T]he racialized causality I am invoking needs to be expansive enough to 
include both straightforward racist motivation and more impersonal social-
structural causation, which may be operative even if the cognizer in question 
is not UDFLVW«%XWLQERWKFDVHVUDFLDOL]HGFDXVDOLW\FDQJLYHULVHWRZKDW,DP
calling white ignorance, straightforwardly for a racist cognizer, but also 
indirectly for a nonracist cognizer who may form mistaken beliefs (e.g., that 
after the abolition of slavery in the United States, blacks generally had 
opportunities equal to whites) because of the social suppression of the 
pertinent knowledge, though without prejudice himself (Mills 2007, p. 21). 
 
,QWKHFDVHRIWKHVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGµUDFLVWFRJQL]HU¶WKHepistemic culpability is 
clearly on display: depending on quite what form the racism takes, such prejudiced 
cognizers are allowing some racist motive (perhaps racial contempt, or some kind of 
racial self-aggrandisement) to distort their perception of the social world and their 
place in it. Such motivated irrationality is plainly epistemically culpable (though of 
course there can be mitigating circumstances that reduce the degree of appropriate 
blame). In cases of hermeneutical injustice, by contrast, neither speaker nor hearer 
need be blameworthy for the failure of intelligibility. In itself hermeneutical injustice 
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is a purely structural phenomenon with no individual perpetrator.16 In some cases the 
hearer would of course be blameworthy²for instance if she were self-interestedly to 
resist the meanings being offered.17 But no such fault is a necessary feature of 
hermeneutical injustice per se. Indeed part of the intrigue of the phenomenon is that it 
can happen so widely without epistemic fault, which is why it calls not only for 
increased individual virtue but also for structural remedy through social policies and 
institutional arrangements that would increase equality of hermeneutical participation.  
What about the question of conceptual poverty²the requisite hermeneutical 
gap? In the case of the straightforward racist cognizer¶VZKLWHLJQRUDQFHWKHUHis no 
hermeneutical gap, indeed no poverty of concepts at all, for the racist cognizer¶V
ignorance is not caused by any lack of conceptual-interpretive resources. Let all the 
hermeneutical resources stand available to him, what he lacks is the epistemic 
discipline to apply the extant resources in an epistemically responsible way so as to 
achieve cognitive contact with social reality. Given these features, the white 
ignorance of the straightforward racist cognizer is clearly not any kind of 
hermeneutical injustice. It is an independent phenomenon, played out at the level of 
belief and (culpable) epistemic conduct. 
Let us look now to the second sort of case that Mills gives us. This is the 
µPRUHLPSHUVRQDOVRFLDO-VWUXFWXUDO¶ case of the non-racist cognizer who nonetheless 
µPD\IRUPPLVWDNHQEHOLHIV«EHFDXVHRIWKHVRFLDOVXSSUHVVLRQRIWKHSHUWLQHQW
knowledge, though without prejudice hiPVHOI¶Perhaps such social suppression could 
be a matter of certain parts or aspects of history not being taught at school; or perhaps 
another example might be the cultural forgetting of the involvement of black 
Caribbean and African soldiers in the Second World War, as noted by Mike and 
Trevor Philipps in relation to British film. In most of these social-structural cases of 
white ignorance, I take it, the individual remains epistemically culpable to some 
significant degree inasmuch as it is likely that she ought to be able to remain critically 
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 Medina develops the point that individuals can however collude in hermeneutical 
injustice by failing to be virtuous hearers (see Medina 2012, and 2013 ch. 3). The 
point is well taken, but I would resist his conclusion that this reveals that there are, 
DIWHUDOOLQGLYLGXDOµSHUSHWUDWRUV¶RIKHUPHQHXWLFDOLQMXVWLFHV)DLOXUHVRIYLUWXHDUH
bad in themselves, and when we fail to be appropriately open to the perspectives of 
others we are doing something bad and may even be wronging them as individuals. 
%XWEHLQJFXOSDEOHIRURQH¶VSDUWLQDEURDGHULQMXVWLFHPDNHVRQHDSHUSHWUDWRURQO\
of that part; it does not make one a perpetrator of the broader injustice itself.   
17
 See Mason (2011), Pohlhaus (2011), Dotson (2012), and Medina (2013). 
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alive to at least some of the ways in which the epistemic situation has been distorted. 
But equally one can imagine (I emphasise, imagine) scenarios in which the individual 
is not culpable, insofar as it is also possible that the epistemic fault driving the µVRFLDO
VXSSUHVVLRQRIWKHSHUWLQHQWNQRZOHGJH¶could be exclusively in the collective, or in 
some sub-group who is manipulating collective knowledge, in a manner that no 
individual could reasonably be expected to detect.18 This in-principle possibility of 
individually non-culpable white ignorance suggests thDW0LOO¶VVRFLDO-structural kind 
of white ignorance can in principle be non-culpable²which prompts one to ask 
whether it might also constitute a case of hermeneutical injustice.  
As before, however, we must also look for some kind of conceptual gap 
caused by hermeneutical marginalisation, for it cannot be a hermeneutical injustice 
without at least some impoverishment in shared conceptual resources. But in itself the 
µVRFLDOVXSpression of the pertinent knowlHGJH¶GRHVQRWLQYROYHDQ\loss of 
interpretive concepts or conceptions. The white-ignorants19 in question might 
continue to have available to them perfectly adequate conceptual resources for 
knowing that X, and yet fail to know that X owing to the suppression of the requisite 
knowledge itself²once again, a dysfunction at the level of belief and evidence rather 
than the level of conceptual repertoire and intelligibility. White British forgetfulness 
about the involvement of African and Caribbean soldiers in the Second World War, 
for instance, involved no deficit of intelligibility, for the shared hermeneutical 
repertoire was quite rich enough to have supported the lost knowledge.  
We might go on, however, to envisage a third, albeit non-standard, case.  One 
FDQLPDJLQHVWUXFWXUDOFDVHVZKHUHWKHµVRFLDOVXSSUHVVLRQRIWKHSHUWLQHQW
NQRZOHGJH¶has included suppression of concepts requisite for that knowledge. If this 
conceptual suppression is confined to the privileged group, a genuine deficit in 
hermeneutical resources for the white community would result, and thereby a deficit 
in the shared hermeneutical resource. With the hermeneutical gap so envisaged, we 
are closer to a case of white ignorance that is also one of hermeneutical injustice.  
Given that the paucity of concepts in this case is all on the part of whites, 
someone might wonder whether it was the white community that was subject to the 
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 I have argued elsewhere that such a case might represent one of epistemic agent-
regret (Fricker 2016). 
19
 As Mills makes entirely clear, and by way of parallel with the phenomenon of false 
consciousness on a Marxist picture, one does not have to be white to become 
embroiled in white ignorance (Mills, 2007, p. 22). But it helps. 
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hermeneutical injustice. Not so; for in order for such a case to constitute a 
hermeneutical injustice the deficit of concepts in the white population would also 
have to be unfair to them in some way. It is true enough that, as Medina emphasizes 
(Medina 2013, p. 108), such a hermeneutical deficit would clearly be bad for the 
white community in a purely epistemic sense, for there is important social knowledge 
they would be missing out on.20 (So it was for CarmLWD:RRG¶VKDUDVVHU It may well 
be morally bad for them too (as it was for the harasser, who was prevented from 
grasping the ethical significance of his own behaviour, and was to that degree 
alienated from the meaning of his own actions).21 But still, the disadvantage cannot be 
an injustice done to them, because ex hypothesi this very epistemic disadvantage plays 
more generally to their social advantage²that is the whole point: white people are 
represented as having an interest in not knowing certain threatening facts, and if the 
very concepts required for such unsettling knowledge have been suppressed, then they 
are all the safer from having to confront it. Rather it is the black community who 
suffers the hermeneutical injustice, for it is they who are asymmetrically socially 
disadvantagHGE\WKHZKLWHV¶FRQFHSWXDOGHILFLW that entails the equivalent deficit in 
the shared hermeneutical resource. 
What we have now arrived at in pursuing the overlap between hermeneutical 
injustice and white ignorance is a form of hermeneutical injustice that belongs in the 
range of cases identified in the previous section as midway between maximal 
(Carmita Wood) and minimal (Joe) forms. Such cases are those LQZKLFKRQHJURXS¶V
communicative attempts meet with failure owing to a paucity of concepts on the part 
of an out-group and therefore in the shared hermeneutical resource. Among those 
cases, we can locate the racially motivated concept-suppression scenario that we have 
identified as a (non-standard) case of white ignorance. The motivated concept 
suppression among the dominant white community means that the hermeneutically 
marginalised black community nonetheless possesses locally operative meanings that 
capture their experiences but which cannot function properly in communicative 
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 Laura Beeby too has emphasized the importance of the purely epistemic 
disadvantage suffered by the more powerful party such cases (Beeby 2011). 
21
 Jason Stanley expresses a general version of this point in relation to legitimizing 
P\WKVµIDOVHLGHRORJLHVKDUPWKHHOLWHVLQZD\VWKDWFXWGHHSHUWKDQPDWHULDOLQWHUHVW
The reason that members of unjustly privileged groups are led to adopt legitimizing 
myths is that they cannot confront the possibility that their actions are unjust. False 
LGHRORJLHVEOLQGHYHQWKRVHWKH\VHHPWRKHOSE\PDNLQJWKHP³XQWUXHWRWKHPVHOYHV¶
(Stanley 2015, p. 265). 
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attempts with social bodies that operate with the impoverished shared conceptual 
repertoire. However ricKWKHEODFNFRPPXQLW\¶V conceptual resources might be, these 
resources do not get integrated into the shared resource, because the white community 
has an interest in keeping them out. This, at last, is the overlap we have been looking 
for: a white ignorance whose explanation is a conceptual deficit (on the part of whites, 
and ipso facto a deficit in the shared hermeneutical resource) that is significantly 
FDXVHGE\WKHEODFNFRPPXQLW\¶VKHUPHQHXWLFDOPDUJLQDOLVDWLRQ In such a case, 
motivated conceptual poverty on the part of a dominant racial group works to 
preserve their local ignorance of a significant dimension of the social world, and 
blocks another racial group from making good that ignorance.  
What about the question of epistemic culpability? In our earlier discussion of 
0LOOV¶knowledge-suppression case I suggested that such cases might normally be 
epistemically culpable, though we could imagine scenarios where there was no 
epistemic culpability. The matter turned on how far it was reasonable, in any given 
case, to expect the uncomprehending hearer to be alert to the distortions in the 
epistemic system. The same goes for our concept-suppression example. Here the 
hermeneutical marginalisation of the black community kettles their concepts, thereby 
creating a conceptual lack in the shared hermeneutical resource, and so preserving 
white ignorance by disabling the essential conceptual means to their understanding 
expressions of black experience. The question of epistemic culpability in such cases 
will depend, as it does in general, upon how far the uncomprehending hearer could 
reasonably be expected to have been alert to the fact of her conceptual 
impoverishment. If she could have known better, then she should have known 
better.22 These issues of individual culpability and non-culpability seem worth 
thinking about in principle, even if we are pessimistic about how much individuals 
can really do.23 In cases of hermeneutical injustice, the requisite structural remedy 
involves the reduction of hermeneutical marginalisation; in cases of white ignorance, 
a whole range of structural remedies is no doubt called for.24 Such structural changes 
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 I have argued more fully for this view of the borders of culpable and non-culpable 
ignorance more fully in Fricker (2010). 
23
 For this concern about the limitations of increased individual virtue, see Alcoff 
(2010), Langton (2010), and Anderson (2012). 
24
 See Anderson (2012) for the proposal that racial integration is essential as a 
structural feature of institutional epistemic justice. For her more general case for 
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are called for in addition to individual efforts²for, after all, structural changes are 
often in significant part the upshot of individual efforts. 
 
Hermeneutical Injustice Is Not Necessarily A Face of Oppression 
 
I hope to have clarified and defended my original characterization of hermeneutical 
injustice by showing that its core notion of hermeneutical marginalisation allows for 
the sorts of midway and/or motivated cases of hermeneutical injustice that other 
writers have rightly emphasised.25 If the driving thought is that hermeneutical gaps 
are typically made rather than found, then I agree. One JURXS¶VPDUJLQDOLVation is 
typically motivated by the interests of another group whose purposes are served by 
the marginalisation. It is therefore in the nature of any marginalisation that ideology, 
and other kinds of privileged motivation, will be chief among its causes. 
Hermeneutical injustice, like testimonial injustice, is typically a face of oppression²
it tends to preserve ignorance that serves the interests of dominant groups.26 
However, I would also affirm that it is important we air possibilities of 
hermeneutical marginalisation that are not themselves part of a pattern of oppression. 
The category is broader than that, for there can be unfair forms of hermeneutical 
marginalisation that are to be explained in terms of more de facto forms of social 
powerlessness, or more fleeting kinds of ideological struggle; and there can 
sometimes be hermeneutical gaps that are more like unforeseen consequences of 
social flux, or of processes that do not particularly reflect the long-term interests of 
one group over another. Perhaps an example might be the kind of hermeneutical 
marginalisation that µteenagers¶LWVelf a new concept at the time) in the early Sixties 
UHEHOOHGDJDLQVW7KH\GLGQ¶WJHWPXFKRIDORRN in to the processes of meaning-
making before that, but they found a noisy way of making new meanings among 
themselves, interpreting and constructing their experiences accordingly. If we imagine 
early-Sixties teenagers trying and failing to convey to their parents what was so great 
about URFN¶Q¶UROODQGHYHU\WKLQJLWVWRRGIRUPD\EHZHFRQIURQWDFDVHRI
hermeneutical injustice of the non-oppression kind I aim to leave room for in my 
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 See Mason (2011), Pohlhaus (2011), Dotson (2012), Medina (2012 and 2013). 
26
 Using the terminology I employed in Epistemic Injustice (Fricker, 2007), I would 
VD\WKDWWHVWLPRQLDODQGKHUPHQHXWLFDOLQMXVWLFHVLQWKHLUµV\VWHPDWLF¶DVRSSRVHGWR
µLQFLGHQWDO¶IRUPVDUHWKHcentral cases of epistemic injustice, because it is these 
forms that reveal the connection with other dimensions of social injustice. 
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characterisation. It is of course political, since it involves a struggle of power²the 
power of one generation over the next²and even of competing ideologies. But we 
would not normally regard it as a matter of oppression, for nobody is a teenager for 
very long, and this kind of struggle represents a near inevitable process that is part 
and parcel of on-going historical change, including ethical change. Such inter-
generational struggle might therefore play a role, even a desirable role, in any human 
society.  
For these reasons the teenage-culture case is not the kind of power struggle we 
would ordinarily characterise as a fight against oppression. It involves the 
hermeneutical marginalisation of the younger generation for sure; but it would be a 
jaundiced view of the perennial struggle between one generation and the next to insist 
that this marginalisation was fundamentally oppressive in nature. It is simply (and 
thankfully) in the nature of young people to want to make their own world, and that 
involves a certain overthrow of parental regime. Where that regime has 
hermeneutically marginalised its young, hermeneutical injustices are bound to arise 
from youthful attempts to express the new social ideas to the older generation.  
+HUPHQHXWLFDOLQMXVWLFHFDQDIIHFWSHRSOH¶VOLYHVin many different ways. I 
believe it is most useful to have a theoretical framework that makes room for all sorts 
of cases, so that the various degrees of wrongful unintelligibility can be seen to run 
from maximal to minimal (from CarmLWD:RRG¶VLQDUWLFXODEOH RXWUDJHWR-RH¶V
articulate yet ultimately frustrated communicative attempts); and so that the forms of 
hermeneutical marginalisation can be seen to run from actively oppressive motivated 
ignorance (as per the case of motivated concept-suppression white ignorance) to 
ordinary attempts by parents to shape a new generation according to values they 
understand. The purpose of placing these different formations in a single theoretical 
structure is to reveal the range of possibilities in all their similarities and differences. 
Ignorance, as we observed at the outset, is not always bad; but social ignorance that 
results from hermeneutical marginalisation is intrinsically likely to be bad insofar as it 
is likely to be conserving ignorance that sustains unequal social relations. Those cases 
clearly are oppressive, and they preserve forms of ignorance that demand to be made 
good.27  
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 Earlier versions of some parts of this paper were first presented at a workshop on 
Josp0HGLQD¶VERRN0HGLQD 2013) at the Autonomous University of Madrid. I am 
grateful to all the participants there for helpful comments, and in particular to Linda 
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